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In February 1997, the Australian media revealed that the Chan govern-
ment planned to use mercenaries against secessionist rebels on
Bougainville. These proposals precipitated the most serious political cri-
sis in Papua New Guinea's postindependence history. Defence Force
Commander Jerry Singirok openly repudiated the government's plan on
17 March, leading a military revolt that culminated in the expulsion of
the mercenaries and the eventual fall of the Chan government. The pri-
vate company involved in the agreement was Sandline International, at
the time an obscure London-based security contractor. Sandline had sub-
contracted Executive Outcomes, a well-known South Africa-based sup-
plier of mercenaries, to conduct the Bougainville operation.!
Singirok's revolt attracted the support of many ordinary Papua New
Guineans concerned about government corruption. A commission of
inquiry was convened shortly after these dramatic events. Its task was to
examine the circumstances surrounding the Sandline contract. With lim-
ited time and resources, it found no evidence of corruption on the part of
any of the ministers or corporate figures involved. Suspicions nevertheless
lingered, and Sir Julius Chan, Defence Minister Mathias Ijape, and sever-
al of their senior colleagues lost their seats in the July 1997 elections. A
second commission of inquiry, established by the new Skate government,
reported in September 1998. Among other things, the second report con-
cluded that Chan's deputy, Finance Minister Chris Haiveta, "had received
corrupt and improper payment" in respect of the Sandline contract
(Independent, 2 Oct 1998).
The Contemporary Pacific, Volume II, Number 2, Fall I999, 279-303
© I999 by University of Hawai'i Press
279
280 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL I999
While the Sandline affair provides the most dramatic example to date,
there have been other cases of privatized militaristic schemes in response
to Papua New Guinea's internal security problems. Given the economic
impact attributed to these problems, the search for solutions has been a
major concern for successive governments. The country's own political
leaders have been the most active proponents of militarization and the
privatization of violence, in part in response to the obvious limitations of
existing state security services. At the same time, ministerial initiatives in
this area have often ended up aggravating the deficiencies. The national
policymaking environment allows individual ministers considerable free-
dom in the formulation of policies and awarding of government con-
tracts. This autonomy, in combination with an autocratic style of leader-
ship and a search for quick-fix solutions, has had a debilitating effect on
particular government agencies. An examination of militaristic initiatives'
in this setting illustrates the powerful reinforcing nexus that has devel-
oped between political patronage and the weakness of the postcolonial
state.
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Papua New Guinea's "law and order" problems are relatively well known
and a perennial topic of public debate. The major manifestations today
are gang violence in the urban centers, banditry in some rural areas and
along the major highways, so-called tribal fighting in parts of the high-
lands, conflicts around large-scale resource development, and election-
related violence. High levels of personal insecurity are reflected in the
flourishing local security industry and in the extraordinary lengths that
many go to protect their persons and property.
Depictions of this state of affairs are, of course, prone to exaggeration
and generalization. As one would anticipate in such a diverse environ-
ment, the overall picture is varied and uneven. Most reported violence
occurs in urban enclaves and other areas of concentrated development,
while the vast majority of Papua New Guineans continue to live in rural
villages. Even in the "high risk" areas, the incidence of crime tends to be
episodic. All the same, there is no denying the seriousness of current
problems with their disproportionate impact on particular groups,
notably women, and the disincentive they provide to foreign investment
and economic development. Nor is there any doubt about the limited
effectiveness of state controls.
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The hiring of Sandline by the Chan government was a direct response
to the unresolved conflict on the island of Bougainville. This conflict
began in 1988 as a dispute between disaffected landowners and the
Australian operators of the Panguna copper mine and quickly developed
into a full-scale secessionist conflict. As well as its tragic toll in human
lives and suffering, the conflict has had a significant impact on the nation-
al economy in terms of lost revenue from the mine and the expense of
prolonged security operations. Prior to its closure in 1989 in the face of
rebel violence, the Panguna mine accounted for 8 percent of gross domes-
tic product, 35 percent of export earnings, and 12 percent of government
revenue (Elek 1992, 63).
For Papua New Guinea's political elite, problems of order have been
perceived primarily in terms of their economic repercussions. These con-
cerns extend well beyond the Bougainville conflict. In 1991, Prime
Minister Rabbie Namaliu told a national crime summit that lawlessness
had the potential to do more economic damage than the Bougainville cri-
sis and the downturn in commodity prices combined (Australian, 12 Feb
1991). The direct costs of crime in terms of property loss, expenditure on
law enforcement, and private security have recently been estimated at 5
percent of gross domestic product annually (Levantis and Chand 1997,
4). Although difficult to evaluate, indirect costs in terms of lost invest-
ment opportunities and personal suffering are likely to be substantial.
Companies like Executive Outcomes are best known for their military
services, but many also provide training for state police forces and private
security services to corporate clients. Executive Outcomes was recently
reported to have placed a bid for security contracts worth an estimated
A$ I million with agricultural and forest companies in South Africa to
"combat crime" (CLW, 5 Mar 1997). Defence Systems Limited, whose
mercenary past has been noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Merce-
naries (UN 1997, para 39), was contracted by the PNG government in
early 1992 to train a special police unit. Distinctions between crime and
political insurgency, and between the roles of civilian police and military
forces, have been progressively blurred in the quest for new markets
(Dinnen 1997, II2-I28). Eben Barlow of Executive Outcomes explained
his company's involvement in the Bougainville operation in terms of
"crime problems":
[A]t the end of the day any government should have its own prerogative who
is best able to help them solve certain problems. The people of Papua New
~'Ir!., j." \
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Guinea have put pressure on the government due to instability. Crime has
been on the increase. The citizens have lost their basic right of private securi-
ty which they no longer have, and the government deemed it necessary to have
their security forces retrained in order to prevent the escalation of crime, as
well as to stabilize areas where the rebels are operating. (SABC TV 1997)
Given the pervasiveness of Papua New Guinea's law and order problems,
the most likely openings for international security contractors are work-
ing with state police and the private sector in the field of protective and
reactive services against "crime." Some of these companies, including
Defence Systems, have also expanded into the area of post-conflict recon-
struction (ABC 1997), and this may provide additional opportunities in
"peace" and "rehabilitation" processes such as those currently underway
on Bougainville.
STATE CONTROLS
The shortcomings of Papua New Guinea's police force reflect a combina-
tion of diminishing institutional capacity and escalating demands.
Coverage provided by the police at independence extended to only 10
percent of the total land area and 40 percent of the population (Dorney
1990, 296). A modest increase in the size of the force in the years since
has failed to match the demands of a growing population and increasing
violence. In 1975, when crime rates were relatively low, the police-pop-
ulation ratio stood at 1:476. By 1996, however, with crime a major con-
cern, the ratio had slipped to 1:800 (Nenta 1996). The nation's 5,000
uniformed officers are currently responsible for policing a population of
more than 4 million. This can be compared to the Australian state of New
South Wales, with a similar population size, but with 13,000 officers and
far more resources.
Given the shortage of government resources and the undeveloped char-
acter of Papua New Guinea's transport infrastructure (with just over half
of the rural population accessible by road2 ), police coverage continues to
be extremely uneven. Many rural areas have little, if any, permanent
police presence. It is not unusual for police vehicles to be temporarily
immobilized owing to lack of funds for fuel or maintenance. Serious
problems of morale and discipline are other features of policing practice
and have contributed to regular allegations of human rights abuses and a
growing number of compensation claims in civil courts. This kind of
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behavior undermines already low levels of public confidence in the police,,
which in turn hinders police investigations.
The deficiencies of criminal justice in general, and policing in particu- .
lar, have led to an increasing reliance on emergency measures as respons-
es to crime and social disorder. These measures have included states of
emergency, curfews, and special police operations. A state of emergency
allows for the suspension of constitutional freedoms and the extension of
police powers and is often combined with a call-out of the defense force
to assist the police. States of emergency have been imposed in response to
so-called tribal fighting in the highlands provinces in 1979, gang violence
in the National Capital District in 1985, and armed rebellion on
Bougainville in 1989. Since 1987, it has been possible to impose a curfew
without declaring a state of emergency, and curfews have since become a
common strategy for dealing with urban crime waves.
These responses are aimed at restoring order in designated areas
through a combination of restrictions on movement, raids against "high
crime" areas (usually settlements in the urban context), and orchestrated
displays of militaristic strength. Such displays belie the actual capacity of
the security forces to contain disorder on any significant scale. While
public order is temporarily restored, crime patterns invariably rise again
once the restrictions are lifted. This cyclical pattern of escalating concern
about violence followed by the imposition of a restrictive (and usually
only partly implemented) "law and order package" has become a famil-
iar one in recent years.
Resort to these blanket measures is indicative of the limitations of the
constabulary in more conventional policing tasks such as detection,
apprehension, and investigation. External assistance to the police has
been provided by the Australian government, the nation's most signifi-
cant aid donor. Substantial capacity-building effort has been directed to
the beleaguered law and justice sector. Program aid to this sector amounts
to 15.6 percent of Australia's total program aid to Papua New Guinea
(AusAID 1996, 6).3 The largest and longest-standing component of this
assistance is the Police Development Project, which since 1987 has pro-
vided advisory and training resources in a range of specialist and general
policing skills.
The limitations of state policing are also reflected in the massive
growth in the local security industry. A recent estimate states that there
are approximately 200 registered and unregistered security companies in
Papua New Guinea, employing about 10,000 staff or, put another way,
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more than twice the number of uniformed state police (Independent, 18
April 1997). The industry is concentrated in the urban centers and offers
a range of protective services. Individual companies vary in size, organi-
zation, and services offered. Clients are likewise diverse, including office
complexes, businesses (large and small), banks, schools, colleges, hospi-
tals, hotels, clubs, restaurants, supermarkets, shops, markets, and the
more affluent private residences.
External assistance to the PNG constabulary has not been confined to
the Australian aid program. Although the police are a national responsi-
bility, provincial governments have often provided financial assistance
and other resources to needy local forces. In 1991, for example, the Enga
provincial government pledged half a million kina toward the construc-
tion of barracks for a mobile squad in the Laiagam district (Post-Courier,
6 Nov 1991). Just before the 1992 national elections, the premier of
Simbu province presented firearms and ammunition to the provincial
police commander (Standish 1994, 70). Local businesses have likewise
provided support. Such actions are justified in terms of the failure of
national authorities to provide sufficient resources, although they some-
times draw criticism as improper attempts to influence the police.
Government ministers have also promoted a number of schemes to
improve police capacity, including the hiring of private contractors to
provide specialist training. The best known example in recent years was
the Rapid Deployment Unit, a special police unit designed to improve
security at mining and petroleum installations in the highlands. This was
an initiative of Mathias Ijape, police minister in the Namaliu administra-
tion (1988-1992). Minister Ijape won cabinet approval in early 1992 for
the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Unit to be trained by a London-
based security contractor, Defence Systems Limited. The chairman of
Defence Systems, Alastair Morrison, visited Papua New Guinea shortly
afterward for talks with senior government officials. Ijape's principal
concern appeared to have been to get the construction of a base for the
unit (in his own constituency of Goroka) started before the June 1992
national elections. Despite intensive lobbying by the company and
Minister Ijape, lack of government funds and a change of government
in June 1992 effectively scuttled Defence Systems' involvement in the
Rapid Deployment Unit. A much smaller version of the proposed unit
was, in fact, deployed (without Defence Systems' involvement) for several
months at the highlands-based projects. Owing to lack of government
funds, the new unit was largely dependent on financial and other assis-
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tance (including transport, accommodation, and a per diem allowance)
from the mining industry. Between April 1992 and December 1993, the
mining and petroleum industry estimated that it spent approximately one
million kina on sustaining the Rapid Deployment Unit-by far the single
largest private contribution to state policing (Dinnen 1996). Not surpris-
ingly, the unit attracted widespread criticism as a form of "company
police."
While the newly elected Wingti government abandoned the Rapid
Deployment Unit proposal, it agreed to proceed with another special
unit, the Police Tactical Force. This was based on a proposal from
Defence Systems, and involved training a quick reaction force to deal
with dangerous and armed criminals, hostage situations, armed raids,
surveillance, protection of public figures, and to enforce the controversial
Internal Security Act. Defence Systems were to be contracted for a peri-
od of two years at a total cost of KIO,575,000. Once again, lack of gov-
ernment funds prevented implementation, and the proposal disappeared
after Wingti was replaced by Sir Julius Chan as prime minister in August
1994. Mathias Ijape was appointed as Chan's defense minister, a position
he held until forced to stand down over the Sandline affair.
Despite a long history of institutional rivalry, the military and the
police have worked together regularly on internal security matters,
including crime control (May 1993, 35-46). Police mobile squads were
also deployed on Bougainville during the secessionist conflict. Indeed,
the brutal behavior of these squads turned many Bougainvilleans against
Papua New Guinea in the early months of the crisis in 1988-89 (Regan
1996, 8). As well as exacerbating the shortage of police personnel in
other parts of the country, the experience on Bougainville has contributed
to the militarization of mainland policing, particularly in parts of the
highlands (Standish 1994, 78-80). A confidential review of the
Australian-funded Police Development Project leaked to the Australian
press spoke of the "serious detrimental effects" that Bougainville service
was having on mobile squads once they returned to mainland duties.
Among the illustrations cited was the practice of mobile squad officers
continuing to wear their unmarked black military uniforms 'during regu-
lar policing operations (Canberra Times, 26 Oct 1992). The joint
deployment of the police and the defense force has also increased open-
ings for private contractors by eroding traditional operational differences
between these two branches of the security forces.
With the notable exception of their successful intervention to quell
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a separatist rebellion on Vanuatu in 1980 (Beasant 1984), the PNG
Defence Force has exhibited many of the same shortcomings as those
of the police. Lack of resources, inadequate training, and poor discipline
have been recurring complaints. These problems have been most
apparent in the conflict with poorly equipped groups of insurgents on
Bougainville. Defense force operations on Bougainville, like those of
their protean adversaries, have attracted regular allegations of serious
human rights abuses (Amnesty International 1993; 1997). A defense
force investigation into the killing of nine soldiers and two mobile squad
members at the Kangu Care Centre in September 1996 by their allies in
the resistance forces4 concluded that the deaths were triggered by a seri-
ous breakdown in security, discipline, and morale among the PNG secu-
rity personnel (National, 25 Oct 1996). A coronial inquiry into the mur-
der of the premier of the Bougainville Transitional Government,
Theodore Miriung, in October 1996, attributed his killing to Papua New
Guinea soldiers and local resistance forces (Suntheralingam 1996).
Despite this finding no action has been taken against those implicated.
Such behavior helped prolong the Bougainville conflict by popularizing
the secessionist cause and deepening the resolve of the rebel leadership
(Regan 1996).
The defense force is also the recipient of Australian assistance through
the Defence Cooperation Program. Sensitivity on the part of Australian
authorities to growing domestic and international disquiet over military
assistance in the Bougainville context has led to the imposition of "con-
ditionalities" over the use of Australian-supplied equipment (eg, heli-
copters supplied under the program should not be used as "gunships").
These "conditionalities" caused great resentment among officials in
Papua New Guinea, who viewed them as impeding the effectiveness of
military operations and, more generally, as unwarranted interferences in
domestic affairs.
The Sandline initiative emerged against the background of stalemate
on Bougainville, a series of humiliating military setbacks (eg, the Kangu
massacre), and, from the perspective of the PNG government, the unwill-
ingness of Australia to provide adequate and "unconditional" support.
On this last point, Sir Julius Chan remarked, "We have requested the
Australians support us in providing the necessary specialist training and
equipment. . . . They have consistently declined and therefore I had no
choice but to go to the private sector" (Independent [UK], 13 March
1997)·
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MILITARISTIC SOLUTIONS
Foreign observers of the Sandline affair were shocked at the willingness
of the PNG government to use mercenaries. For some time the Australian
authorities had been trying to persuade their counterparts in Port
Moresby that peace on Bougainville could only be achieved through a
negotiated settlement between all the parties. Although the introduction
of mercenaries was a new departure, the militaristic character of the·
Chan government's proposal came as less of a surprise to many in Papua
New Guinea and other parts of Melanesia (Kabutaulaka 1997, 129-
135)'
The Individual and Community Rights Advocacy Forum (ICRAF), a
human rights organization that campaigned against the Sandline propos-
al, is one of a number of local groups that have denounced the growth of
"violence" and "militarization" in the country: "Violence has escalated
everywhere in Papua New Guinea, and many people live in fear. What is
most alarming is the increase of violence being used as a way to resolve
our disputes and conflicts, as seen in the increase in tribal, domestic and
state violence. This violence only perpetuates a cycle of violence and it
does not really resolve anything" (ICRAF 1997, 12).
The director of this group was one of four local activists arrested in
May 1997 in connection with their alleged role in opposing the Sandline
initiative (Post-Courier, 7 May 1997; Independent, 9 May 1997). Veteran
Bougainville parliamentarian John Momis commented at the time, "Some
of us are getting sick and tired of reading about our disciplined forces
engaging in a culture of violence in which confrontation and the use of
brute force to maintain law and order is the norm, rather than the excep-
tion" (Post-Courier, 9 May 1997).
These statements echo a view shared by many students, church groups,
trade unions, and nongovernment organizations that state responses to
internal security problems have themselves become part of the problem.
In addition to the open militarization of the Bougainville conflict, there
has been the de facto normalization of emergency powers in response to
violence, discussed earlier. The draconian law-and-order packages peri-
odically announced by governments are another illustration of militaris-
tic solutions.
Prior to recent political and financial upheavals in the region, leaders
were inclined to praise the apparent success of authoritarian and mili-
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taristic regimes in some of Papua New Guinea's Asian neighbors. This
was to become an important element of the so-called Look North policy
initially espoused by the second Wingti administration (1992-1994).
Earlier, in 1991, government officials had contacted a number of private
military contractors in connection with a proposed national guard. The
idea was to recruit ex-Ghurkha soldiers to train a paramilitary guard that
would absorb unemployed youth, instilling personal discipline and voca-
tional skills. The controversial Internal Security Act of 1993, with its
restrictions on constitutional rights, was directly inspired by repressive
legislation in force in a number of neighboring countries (Dinnen 1993).
Advocacy of elite police and military squads has been another feature of
law-and-order policy debate. The Rapid Deployment Unit and its pro-
posed successor, the Police Tactical Force, are cases in point. Both
entailed the establishment of quick reaction, paramilitary police units
aimed at suppressing localized outbreaks of "terrorism." The militaristic
orientation of these units was an important part of their appeal to minis-
terial supporters, like the then police minister Mathias Ijape. It was also,
incidentally, a major source of concern to Australian advisers attached to
the Police Development Project who were attempting to transform the
paramilitary character of PNG policing. The contractor in this case,
Defence Systems Limited, openly traded on its military credentials. "The
benefit of engaging DSL consultants in the formation and training of PTF
type units is that the client is buying the United Kingdom Police/Army
model-which is a proven, tried and regularly tested set of concepts and
responses to violent crime and terrorism. DSL instructors bring with them
operational experience that has been gained in counter-terrorist opera-
tions since 1972 in the UK and in all subsequent major incidents"
(Defence Systems Limited nd, 2).
To a large extent, militarized responses to internal conflict in Papua
New Guinea are a consequence of the institutional weaknesses of state
agencies and their inability to secure desired outcomes by noncoercive
means. Institutional incapacity has also given rise to a high degree of
impunity with respect to state violence. The violence of "bits of state,"
like that of criminals, often goes unpunished. It is also the case, as stated
earlier, that the militarization of the Bougainville conflict has had a defi-
nite "carryover" effect in terms of the management of conflict on the
mainland.
The militarization of state responses cannot, however, be neatly sepa~
rated from violence in the wider society. The Law Reform Commission
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has documented the extent of violence against women in marital rela-
tionships (LRC I98S; I986; I992), while other evidence confirms high
levels of violence against women in other contexts. Concern with gang
crime in recent years has been as much directed at the level of violence
involved as at the number of offenses. While the resurgence of so-called
tribal fighting is partly a response to the inadequacies of state processes
of dispute resolution, it is also about the continuing acceptance of vio-
lence as a strategy for resolving conflict in some parts of the country. The
same can be said about violence in the electoral context (Strathern I993;
Standish I996).
The masculinity of criminal violence has, to a large extent, been
matched by that of state violence. Police operate in a working culture that
glorifies the tough cop and celebrates adversarial relationships with crim-
inals. Speaking on the eve of the I98 S state of emergency in the National
Capital District, the police minister used the idiom of warfare to describe
relations between police and criminals. "Out there at night when we are
in bed there is warfare ... between the Constabulary and the crimi-
nals. That is exactly what the situation is, when we are asleep the crimi-
nals and the police are fighting a war" (PNG I98S, 32).
Senior police officers regularly issue orders to "shoot to kill" suspect-
ed lawbreakers in high crime areas (Post-Courier, 24 Oct I996). Cultural
stereotypes are often used to legitimate the use of state violence against
particular groups. This is most common in the highlands. In I992, a
police mobile squad officer told an Australian journalist, "Sometimes
burning villages is a must. If we can have them [Highlands criminals]
arrested, fine. If we can have them shot, terrific. Those guys have to be
eliminated. There's no place for them in this society. In the Highlands you
have to use force. It is force against force" (Canberra Times, 26 Oct
I99 2).
Against this background, it is perhaps not surprising that Papua New
Guinea's political leaders have favored demonstrations of "strongman-
ship" (Filer I992, I3S) in response to internal security problems. Such
strategies accord with a relatively high tolerance of coercive solutions in
the society at large. Proposing coercive measures is also easier than the
onerous task of formulating and implementing strategies that address
underlying problems. The difficulties with policy implementation, evident
across all sectors of government, illustrate the limited capacity of the
PNG state to sustain integrated policy initiatives. Frequent changes in
personnel at ministerial and senior departmental levels can also subvert
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such initiatives, resulting in a marked lack of policy continuity. This situ-
ation is further aggravated by shortage of government funds.
Commenting in 1991 on the appeal of elite security units to government
ministers, senior police officers observed, "No elite crack or SAS type
force can disguise the need for an effective substitute for solid basic
round-the-clock protective policing. It is when routine and basic policing
break down or are allowed to become weakened especially through lack
of resources, that the tendency grows to fill the void or gap with a tacti-
cal mobile type 'crush' response" (PNG Police Commissioner 1991).
The short duration of most national administrations in Papua New
Guinea adds to the pressure for quick results. Coercive solutions offer the
prospect of speedier outcomes than those likely to flow from protracted
negotiations or cumbersome bureaucratic processes directed toward poli-
cies addressing underlying "causes."
An additional consideration in the Sandline affair, as with Ijape's ear-
lier rapid deployment initiative, was the impending national elections.
The resolution of the Bougainville crisis had become a major preoccupa-
tion of the Chan administration and, in particular, of Sir Julius himself.
Lack of progress in negotiations with rebel leaders, military setbacks, and
the looming elections, added to pressure for a resolution by whatever
means possible. In his evidence to the first commission of inquiry,
Sandline Director Tim Spicer stated that the time frame for the proposed
Bougainville operation was largely dictated by the elections scheduled for
mid-1997, with government leaders insisting that the operation be con-
ducted before the commencement of voting in June (Independent, 4 April
1997). Chan clearly anticipated electoral benefits from the resolution of
the Bougainville· conflict, and in his view coercion provided the most
viable strategy in the time available. Had Singirok not made his dramat-
ic intervention, Chan anticipated that he might have reaped electoral
rewards from a successful Sandline strike.
LEADERSHIP AND PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION
While the initial focus during the Sandline crisis was on the use of mer-
cenaries and the resulting strain in relations between Papua New Guinea
and Australia, Singirok's open defiance on 17 March switched attention
to the circumstances surrounding the engagement of the company.
Corruption emerged as the central issue, galvanizing popular support for
the military revolt and framing the subsequent course of events.
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Ironically, allegations against Singirok himself were soon to topple him
from his pedestal as anticorruption hero.
In opposing the Sandline project, Singirok emphasized the "improper"
relations between the parties involved in the negotiations and the failure
to follow established procedures. "Sandline executives ... had direct
access to the Prime Minister, ministers for Finance and Defence.
Decisions are made between themselves and directions are then given to
departmental heads by the ministers concerned for us to comply (sic). The
checks and balances in our decision-making process and committee sys-
tem have become mere rubber stamps in this exercise, resulting in a very
expensive contract which has serious negative social, security, economic
and political implications" (Post-Courier, 18 March 1997).
In the same statement, Singirok speculated about improprieties in
Sandline's purchase of military equipment from former Eastern bloc
countries. In his view, the company acquired equipment cheaply and sold
it to the government at "exorbitant prices allowing the potential for size-
able percentages for commissions to all parties involved." He also drew
attention to the "suspicious" presence in Hong Kong of Deputy Prime
Minister Haiveta and Defence Minister Ijape, along with Tim Spicer, at
the time when the first contractual installment of us$18 million was
remitted to Sandline's account in that city. Singirok later claimed that
Minister Ijape had promised him he would become "a rich man" if he
supported the Sandline proposal (SMH, 9 April 1997).
Singirok appealed to wider concerns about government corruption,
inviting allegations against "dishonest leaders," and calling for public
release of the findings of a number of previous investigations into "sus-
pect" government dealings.s Popular perceptions of corruption in Papua
New Guinea relate to the way in which political leaders are believed to
manipulate their positions to accumulate personal wealth (Larmour
1997). The privileged access to public funds granted to national politi-
cians (often in the form of discretionary funds), in combination with the
limited effectiveness of legal and administrative controls, has facilitated
abuses at this level. Opportunities are greatest in the case of government
ministers, given their control over departmental spending. Processes of
awarding licenses and lucrative government contracts are especially vul-
nerable.6
Singirok's allegations struck a popular chord and won support from a
number of unexpected quarters. In the words of the governor-general,
"The termites of greed, corruption, manipulation, selfishness and abuse
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of public office have reached alarming proportion. We ,have gone exces-
sively beyond the tolerable levels for national forgiveness from the citi-
zens of this country" (Post-Courier, 19 March 1997).
The National Intelligence Organisation voiced similar concerns in a
report leaked to the local press. "What Jerry Singirok was on about was
stopping the ever-growing spiral of corruption that started after
Independence and has grown alarmingly with each passing year. . . .
What will our country be like by the year 2000? Do we really wish to be
reduced to a basket case like certain African nations or even closer to
home like the Solomon Islands?" (Post-Courier, 14 April 1997).
The first commission of inquiry into the Sandline contract began hear-
ing evidence on I April 1997. Its terms of reference were to inquire into:
(I) The process (including negotiations and procedures) which resulted in the
Independent State of Papua New Guinea entering into contractual or other
arrangements with a body called Sandline International whereby overseas per-
sonnel were engaged to assist the Papua New Guinea Defence Force in deal-
ing with the actions of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army on Bougainville
Island;
(2) The terms of the contractual or other arrangements made with Sandline
International. (PNG 1997b)
The commission heard evidence from most of the main participants
and key witnesses, received written submissions from a variety of sources,
and conducted a short investigatory visit to Hong Kong. The final report
was submitted to Acting Prime Minister John Giheno on 29 May
1997. The carefully worded conclusion stated, "There is no credible
evidence to date of 'other arrangements' surrounding the engagement of
Sandline International and there is no credible evidence upon which a
finding of personal corruption or impropriety could be made against Sir
Julius Chan, Mr Mathias Ijape, Brigadier General Singirok or against
any public official of the State of Papua New Guinea" (PNG 1997b,
7·14)·
Although there was "insufficient evidence upon which a finding of per-
sonal corruption" could be made against Chris Haiveta, the report cast
aspersions on his evidence concerning his dealings with Sandline contacts
in Hong Kong and his denial of knowledge about the substantial increase
in the price of Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) shares coinciding with
his Hong Kong visit.? In response to one of Singirok's key allegations, the
report found that on available evidence it could not be established that
DINNEN • MILITARISTIC SOLUTIONS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 293
the Sandline equipment was sold to the government for "exorbitant
prices" (PNG 1997b, 7.8).
Ultimately the report raised more questions than it answered. Its limi-
tations related, in part, to the short duration of the inquiry, as well as to
the sheer complexity of the issues. Many of these concerned matters orig-
inating, or leading, overseas that were not amenable to scrutiny in the
time available. Dissatisfaction with the first inquiry lay behind the newly
installed Skate government's decision to set up a fresh inquiry with
broader terms of reference.
PROCESS ISSUES
Evidence presented to the first inquiry provides ample illustration of the
autocratic style of ministerial leadership, involving the compulsion of
senior government officials and routine breaches of administrative proce-
dures. Singirok drew attention to the intense political pressure and career
insecurity experienced by many senior administrators in Papua New
Guinea. Explaining why he did not raise his objections to the Sandline
proposal at an earlier stage, he stated, "Well, if the Deputy Prime
Minister turns up at your house at midnight, discussing the thing until
half past one in the morning, if the Minister for Defence is forever on
your back checking, checking. . . . I was under extreme political pres-
sure. If I had raised a question then I would have been sacked and I would
not make my voice heard" (AFR, 6 June 1997).
Approval to transfer the first payment of us$18 million to Sandline's
Hong Kong account resulted from what the report described as "consid-
erable pressure placed upon officers of the Central Bank and the Papua
New Guinea Banking Corporation" (PNG 1997b, 3.52). The inquiry
heard of other instances of late-night phone calls, visits, and unscheduled
meetings involving senior politicians, unofficial advisers, and perplexed
bureaucrats. The most influential of the unofficial advisers turned out to
be a mysterious Hong Kong broker, Rupert McCowan, who had become
a close associate of Finance Minister Haiveta during the earlier privatiza-
tion of PNG mining and oil assets. McCowan, who was subsequently
sacked by his Hong Kong employers, emerged as a key broker in the
Sandline deal (AFR, 6 June 1997).
Procedural safeguards applying to government contracts were either
ignored or dispensed with on grounds of urgency or national security.
When the National Executive Council (the cabinet) approved the Sand-
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line proposal on 15 January 1997, there was still no draft contract and
the state solicitor had not been instructed to draft one or examine the
legal implications of what had been approved. The usual procedure of
getting the state solicitor to consider the cabinet submission in advance
was not followed (PNG I997b, 3.26). The attorney general's opinion was
sought after the cabinet had already approved the contract!
The Sandline contract was prepared entirely by the company's own
advisers in London. Papua New Guinea authorities appeared to have had
no direct input in negotiating the terms of the agreement. Moreover, there
was no examination of these terms once they became known. According
to the report, "No one, on receipt of the Sandline draft contract, seems
to have given any thought to having its terms checked. There had still not
been any investigation carried out to verify the prices Sandline had attrib-
uted to the equipment it was supplying. Under the draft contract the State
was to make an immediate payment to Sandline, in Hong Kong, of us$I8
million without receiving anything in return, and without any security or
guarantee of performance on the part of Sandline" (PNG I997b, 3.28).
When the state solicitor sought to raise some matters about the costing
of the contract, Sandline's financial controller, Michael Grunberg, made
it clear that the company was not prepared to reconsider any of the con-
tract's terms (PNG I997b, 3.42). According to Defence Secretary James
Melegepa, "it was not a negotiation at all" (National, 30 April 1997).
The most remarkable illustration of procedural subterfuge was
Minister Haiveta's imaginative scheme for paying Sandline. The vehicle
chosen was a moribund company called Roadco. Haiveta initially sought
to transfer funds from the proceeds of the privatization of the govern-
ment's mining and oil interests to the Roadco account. He was dissuaded
from this course after senior officials pointed out that the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund would regard this as a serious
breach of their agreement with Papua New Guinea. Instead, Haiveta
arranged to acquire funds by cutting various departmental budgets. In the
government's own books, the Sandline contract appeared as the "sunk
cost" of Roadco taking over the Bougainville mine through "investing"
in a military operation to free the mine site (APR, 6 June 1997). Needless
to say, this scheme was never discussed with 54 percent shareholder in the
mine, Conzinc Rio Australia-Rio Tinto Zinc. Confronted with a "tech-
nical difficulty" requiring finance ministers to tender all goods and ser-
vices exceeding K500,000, Haiveta simply divided the contract into 90
nominal parcels each worth K500,000, ostensibly on legal advice. The
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second Sandline inquiry criticized Haiveta's actions in this respect, view-
ing them as a breach of the Public Finances (Management) Act.
Other suspicions surrounded the alleged attempt to acquire a financial
interest in the mine by Sandline and their shadowy associates. The second
inquiry found no evidence of any arrangement between Haiveta and any
other person concerning the purchase of CRA shares in Bougainville
Copper Limited. The Australian Securities Commission, which was inves-
tigating dealings with BCL shares in January and February I997, refused
to disclose its findings to the inquiry. Suspicions were first raised when Sir
Julius Chan announced his government's intention to buy back control of
the mine at the beginning of March I997 (AFR, 3 March I997). In his evi-
dence, Singirok claimed that Sandline was more interested in gaining a
stake in Bougainville's natural resources than in resolving the conflict
(SMH, IO April I997). Although Spicer publicly denied that his company
was seeking mining concessions, a document signed by him and present-
ed to the inquiry suggested a joint venture with the PNG government and
Rio Tinto Zinc to operate the repossessed Panguna mine. In a letter to
Defence Minister Ijape, Spicer proposed, "We may be able to assist with
funding and could come to some arrangements regarding part repayment
with mineral concessions" (Independent, 4 April I997).
This suggestion was apparently not taken up by the PNG authorities.
Counsel assisting the first inquiry claimed that "it is quite plain through
the whole history of the saga that the Sandline interests had an ongoing
keen interest in the mine itself and to get an interest in the mine for them-
selves" (Independent, I6 May I997).
The same inquiry was also told how Sandline first became involved
with the PNG government. In early I996, Minister Ijape had been trying
to purchase military equipment for use on Bougainville. He contacted his
old acquaintance Alastair Morrison, chairman of Defence Systems.
Morrison, in turn, put Ijape in touch with Tim Spicer of Sandline, anoth-
er London-based contractor.
GOVERNANCE
What do these events mean for broader issues of governance in Papua
New Guinea? The issue of state capacity stands out as a recurring strand
in the earlier discussion. Integral to the growth of private security con-
tractors on a global scale has been the limited capacity of many states to
provide the foundation of law and order necessary to pursue economic
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and other basic goals. I have already noted the significant economic costs
of the Bougainville conflict and lawlessness in other parts of Papua New
Guinea. Companies like Sandline, Defence Systems, and Executive
Outcomes offer quick-fix solutions to internal security problems, substi-
tuting their own specialist capacities for those of the weak state. In prac-
tice, however, these interventions often end up aggravating the problems
they seek to resolve.
In order to finance these initiatives, funds and other resources have to
be diverted away from already weak agencies. According to the police,
staffing Minister Ijape's Rapid Deployment Unit would have meant clos-
ing down four police stations in Port Moresby and four in Lae. When
Defence Systems Limited proposed the Police Tactical Force in I993 at an
estimated cost of KIO,575,OOO, the police commissioner wrote to his min-
ister suggesting that funds at hand "should be directed towards my gross-
ly under-funded recurrent expenditure requirements, so that the
Constabulary can make good some of its current deficiencies, and
improve its services to the people" (PNG Police Commissioner I993).
The same sentiments were echoed by Singirok in the midst of the
Sandline controversy, three and a half years later. "It is my professional
and ethical view that it is wrong to hire Sandline International to carry
out the operations on Bougainville at a price which could re-equip and
boost the morale of our Security Forces who for the past nine years have
managed to contain the uprising given the depleted resources, personal
sacrifices and lack of funding for vital allowances and supplies from suc-
cessive governments" (Post-Courier, I8 March I997).
Public monies diverted for special operations such as the Sandline pro-
ject inevitably cut into the recurrent budgets of government departments
and aggravate capacity problems. According to local newspaper reports,
a total of K6.7 million was cut from the defense budget to pay for the
Sandline operation (Post-Courier, 28 May I997). Two months after the
suspension of the operation, the acting chief of staff complained that
Sandline expenditure had left the defense force so short of funds that it
was having serious difficulty feeding its troops (Radio Australia External
Service, 24 May I997).
Government agencies and services not directly involved in these
schemes are also likely to be affected. In addition to its impact on the
defense budget, the Sandline expenditure reportedly led to cuts of K2.5
million from the police, K2.5 million from health, and another K2 million
from education. The acting finance minister, who replaced the "stood
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down" Chris Haiveta, admitted that the Sandline crisis had put the
national economy back by five or six years (Post-Courier, I2 May I997).
The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank-two of the agen-
cies funding Papua New Guinea's structural adjustment program-were
also reported to have temporarily suspended their contributions pending
investigations into whether the Sandline expenditure breached program
commitments (Post-Courier, 2I May I997).
The Sandline case, like that of the Rapid Deployment Unit, provides a
vivid example of the reinforcing dynamic between political patronage and
the institutional weakness of the PNG state. A high level of ministerial
autonomy and a corresponding weakness of institutional controls is evi-
dent throughout the contract "negotiations" (Regan I997, 82-94). The
politicians most directly involved treated the proposal as their own per-
sonal project, excluding other colleagues at will, intimidating senior offi-
cials, and consistently ignoring administrative procedures. Such behavior
has become a major factor contributing to problems of state capacity.
Ministerial initiatives are often thrust on government agencies with little,
if any, prior consultation with senior managers or consideration of how
they might affect existing policy programs and objectives. The frequent
issuance of new directives generates frustration, resentment, and prob-
lems of morale among the public servants charged with their implemen-
tation. Overt resistance within the institutions concerned is, in most
cases, suppressed owing to the power wielded by ministers over senior
appointments. This pattern of relations between ministers and senior
bureaucrats entrenches the dominance of the ministers by allowing for
the removal of their best-informed critics, while intimidating others into
. .paSSive acqUIescence.
The susceptibility of weak state institutions to colonization by external
actors further undermines their capacity to define and protect their own
corporate interests. In this situation, agencies concerned mayhecome lit-
tle more than bystanders to struggles over their institutional control. This
was certainly the case when the police were caught in the middle between
Defence Systems and the Australian-funded Police Development Project
over the proposed Police Tactical Force (Dinnen I996, I96-236). It
seems likely that Singirok's open mutiny in the Sandline case was also, in
large part, directed against this loss of institutional control. The reinforc-
ing aspect of this dynamic is that political patronage accentuates institu-
tional incapacity, which invites external intervention, with further oppor-
tunities for patronage, and so on.
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In the Sandline case, the defense force was already the recipient of sub-
stantial capacity-building assistance funded by the Australian govern-
ment. Aid-funded assistance to coercive agencies-whether the military
or the police-is a highly sensitive issue. Allegations of human rights
abuses on the part of the institutions concerned can severely embarrass
the donor government, and may result in the imposition of "conditional-
ities" of the kind mentioned. Such conditionalities, in turn, can cause
great offense to recipient governments and ministers, who view them as
violations of sovereignty. Recipients may then be tempted to turn to the
private sector for services without strings attached. In this situation, pri-
vate contractors are being consciously used to circumvent the restrictions
attaching to government-to-government assistance. The irony here is that
private solutions in the area of internal security can lead to even greater
threats to sovereignty, as when private contractors acquire substantial
ownership in strategic national mining assets.
THANKS TO TERENCE WESLEy-SMITH of the University of Hawai'i and Peter
Larmour and Anthony Regan of the Australian National University for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Notes
I In December 1998, Executive Outcomes announced that it was ceasing
business. Company officials claimed that a newfound sense of "law and order"
across the African continent rendered its military services redundant. More skep-
tical observers attributed the company's announcement to new legislation direct-
ed against mercenary activities enacted by the South African government
(Independent [UK], II Dec 1998).
2 While just over half the rural population is accessible by road, almost 10
percent are accessible only by an unsurfaced road, likely to be impassable after
rain or during the wet season. A further 9 percent are accessible only by a com-
bination of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter, 2 percent by fixed-wing alone, and
a further 2 percent by helicopter alone (PNG 1997a, 12).
3 This compares to 12.9 percent allocated to the Health Sector, 14.1 percent
to Renewable Resources, 24.8 percent to Transport and Communications, and
30 percent to Education (AusAID 1996, 6). A more detailed discussion of
Australian aid to the PNG law and order sector may be found in Engel (1994).
4 The so-called resistance has been armed by the PNG government and
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comprises Bougainvilleans fighting alongside the defense force against the
Bougainville Revolutionary Army.
5 He also called for the release of reports of a number of ongoing investiga-
tions. These covered the purchase of an investment property in Cairns on behalf
of the Public Officers Superannuation Fund, the purchase of the PNG consulate
in Brisbane, the building of a new private hospital in Port Moresby, the National
Capital District water supply investigation, and the investigation into the build-
ing of the Pore Porena freeway in Port Moresby.
6 A former chief ombudsman commissioner listed the four most common
forms of economic crime in Papua New Guinea as: the abuse of licensing
regimes, the "hands in the till" syndrome, political corruption and vote buying,
and kickbacks and other improprieties in the decision-making process for gov-
ernment contracts (Maino, 1994).
7 In March 1997 the Australian government was reportedly inquiring into
heavy share trading in BCL shares that had occurred shortly before the media
revealed the existence of the Sandline plan and before the PNG government
announced its intention to buy back the mine. More than one million shares
were apparently purchased. Australian media reports at the time speculated that
the share trading might have involved senior members of the PNG government
(Post-Courier, 10 March 1997, 35).
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Abstract
Papua New Guinea's Sandline affair provides the most dramatic illustration of
militarization among the Pacific Island states. Although this was the first resort
to mercenaries, there have been other examples of PNG governments hiring pri-
vate military contractors for assistance in internal security matters. Recent years
have seen an increasing reliance on militaristic solutions to crime and other
forms of conflict. This trend is partly a response to the well-documented weak-
nesses of the police and defense forces. Political leaders have shown a marked
preference for "tough," "quick-fix" solutions. Reliance on militaristic responses
can, at one level, be viewed as a way of compensating for state weakness by rely-
ing on its ostensibly strongest aspect. At the same time, the militaristic orienta-
tion of government actions in this area cannot be separated from wider societal
tolerance of violence as a strategy for resolving conflict. Militaristic solutions
have not only failed to resolve problems of order but have often ended up aggra-
vating them. They have also had a debilitating impact on many of the govern-
ment agencies concerned. Ministerial autonomy allows senior political leaders to
initiate and pursue militaristic schemes that have often been little more than vehi-
cles for the advancement of the individual leader's electoral and other interests.
Such initiatives in the area of internal security illustrate the reinforcing nexus
between political patronage and the weakness of the PNG state.
KEYWORDS: leadership, militarization, Papua New Guinea, police, political
patronage, Sandline affair, security
